The legitimacy of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro remains in question following the July 28 elections, in which he was declared the winner by the pro-government National Electoral Council (CNE).
The European Union’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, recently described his government as “authoritarian” and “dictatorial”, while Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez reiterated his request for the Venezuelan authorities to publish detailed voting records so that the elections can be audited.
This is a request that has been echoed by much of the international community, including the United States, the European Union and dozens of other countries in Latin America and around the world.
While the CNE has failed to comply with this essential procedure to support the results, the opposition did publish more than 80% of the minutes, according to which its candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, not only won but did so by a wide margin.
Despite these questions, Maduro has once again received the support of three important players on the international scene: China, Russia and Iran congratulated him on his “victory” after the elections, reaffirming their support for the Venezuelan leader, whose government has been subjected to international sanctions in recent years.
The first two are major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council – with veto power – while the third is a regional power in the Middle East and one of the world’s leading oil and gas producing countries.
In opposition to the West, these three governments have consistently defended the legitimacy of Maduro’s mandates and were among the first to recognize him as the winner of the July 28 elections.
Maduro, for his part, has always praised the ties his government maintains with these countries, which he considers strategic partners.
“We have the support of countries with cutting-edge technology in drone combat, anti-drone: our sister Russia, our sister China, our sister Iran. So let no one be mistaken about Venezuela. We are a nation of peace,” said the Venezuelan president during a military parade on July 5 to commemorate Venezuela’s independence.
For this report, BBC Mundo tried to consult with spokespeople for the Maduro government, as well as with the foreign ministries and embassies of China, Russia and Iran in Venezuela. At the time of publishing this article there was no response.
But how important has the support of these countries been for Maduro in the decade he has been in power? And what do they gain by backing the Venezuelan leader?
Additional supports
“If it weren’t for those three governments, it’s very likely that the Maduro government would not have withstood the maximum pressure of the sanctions,” says Joseph Humire, executive director of the Washington-based Center for a Secure Free Society.
Humire says that China, Russia and Iran offer different forms of support to the Venezuelan president.
“All three give him political support, but I think their greatest support is that they feed the parallel economy in Venezuela. That has been very important because, while the formal economy in Venezuela was declining, they have been able to use various schemes to help the country obtain fuel, food and other products to withstand the economic crisis,” the expert said in conversation with BBC Mundo.
Evan Ellis, a researcher specializing in Latin America at the U.S. Army War College, believes that the support of these three countries has helped Maduro overcome international sanctions and waves of internal protests.
“Over the years, China, Russia and Iran have contributed to the survival of the regime in different and sometimes complementary ways,” Ellis told BBC Mundo.
“This combination of support from China on the economic side, from Russia on defense, and from Iran to solve important problems has helped Maduro to resist. They have given him both political cover and economic support,” he adds.
China’s silent support
A central element of China’s support is reflected in the volume of loans it has granted to Venezuela since the arrival of Chavez.
Beijing has lent Caracas some $59 billion, far more than any other country in the region and, in fact, almost double the $32 billion it lent to Brazil, according to 2023 data from the Inter-American Dialogue think tank.
The repayment of these loans to Venezuela was guaranteed by future oil sales.
Ellis explains that these funds were delivered between 2008 and 2015, and that most of them were a sort of three-year revolving line of credit that was paid with crude oil deliveries.
“These credits stopped flowing in 2012 and resumed a bit after the transition from Chávez to Maduro, but they ended in 2015. From then until 2019, China was in a process of consolidation and collection, so basically what it did was receive Venezuelan oil, to the point that (the government of Caracas) only has about $10 billion left to pay,” he says.
The expert explains that in recent years, China has not invested large amounts of money in its oil and mining projects in Venezuela.
“It should be noted that, although China has not granted new loans, it has continued to receive Venezuelan oil and has probably provided the Venezuelan government with some benefit from these activities, which have been extended in recent years,” he added.
After the United States approved sanctions against Venezuela in 2019, Beijing took measures to reduce the risk to which its companies were exposed, especially those such as the oil company CNPC that could be harmed by operating globally.
“So China tried to continue buying Venezuelan oil, but in a hidden way. They used independent companies that would take the oil to the coast of Malaysia and then transfer it to another ship before importing it to China,” Ellis said.
According to reports in the business press, and in particular by Reuters, after the introduction of sanctions against Venezuela, there were private companies and refiners that dedicated themselves to buying Venezuelan crude oil, which they mixed and recertified to pass off as Malaysian when exporting it to China.
“It has been a continuous help. China’s purchase of oil has provided some liquidity to the Maduro regime, helping to ensure that it has some money,” Ellis adds.
Cooperation between the two countries has extended to other areas. During the Covid-19 pandemic, China was a key ally of Venezuela, providing it with masks, medicines, biosecurity suits and air purifiers, among other supplies. Venezuela also received millions of doses of Chinese vaccines against the disease.
Some experts say Beijing’s help has also facilitated the Venezuelan government’s social control measures and harsh response to protests and the opposition.
“China has sold some of the weapons that the authorities are now using for repression, such as riot gear and tanks,” says Joseph Humire.
“These big white vehicles are made in China. So are the so-called hippos that spray protesters with water cannons,” Ellis adds.
The white vehicles Ellis mentions are Chinese-made VN-4 light armoured personnel carriers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms transfer database, Beijing is estimated to have supplied around 120 such vehicles to the Bolivian National Guard.
China has also been the provider of surveillance and cybersecurity technology that, according to experts, the Maduro government uses to control dissidents and opponents.
The “Carnet de la Patria” system, through which the government provides different types of financial aid to citizens, was developed with the support of the Chinese company ZTE.
According to investigations by Venezuelan media, this system integrates information from numerous public institutions – from the Electoral Registry to the tax office – as well as data on the ownership of accounts in state banks, accounts on social networks and information on political affiliation.
Beijing has also provided Maduro with significant political cover in recent years. On July 29, just hours after the CNE announced that Maduro had won the presidential election, China congratulated the president, ignoring opposition complaints and the fact that the electoral body itself had not provided detailed and auditable results that would allow verification of what happened.
Similarly, in 2019, Beijing and Moscow vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for “free elections” in Venezuela, amid questions about the elections in which Maduro had been re-elected for a second term.
Politically, China and Venezuela raised the level of their relationship a year ago by announcing the establishment of a “strategic alliance” during a visit by Maduro to Beijing.
Support for the “One China” principle
Jinsong Chen, Senior Reporter, BBC Chinese Service
Venezuela has been one of China’s biggest allies in Latin America since 2000 and Maduro has reciprocated Chinese support in all areas.
On June 28, 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Maduro exchanged messages to commemorate half a century of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
Xi said the two countries have “supported each other in the changing international landscape, worked together to uphold international fairness and justice as well as the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries, and forged an ‘ironclad’ friendship.”
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil said his country would “consistently” uphold the One China principle, which recognizes Taiwan as an inalienable part of China and firmly supports China on issues related to sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Moscow’s political and military coverage
In the mid-2000s, Venezuela became the largest buyer of Russian weapons in Latin America.
The bulk of these purchases occurred between 2005 and 2013. By that year, $11 billion in military contracts had already been fulfilled and another $2 billion worth was about to be concluded, according to information published by the Russian state corporation Rostec.
Since then, Venezuela’s economy has been in a tailspin, making it difficult to acquire more weapons, but close relations between the governments of Vladimir Putin and Maduro have continued.
In fact, when the Venezuelan economy was deflating in 2014, the Russian oil company Rosneft gave the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA loans and credits for some $6.5 billion; and, two years later, it gave another US$1.5 billion, offering as collateral 49.9% of Citgo, the oil refining company that Venezuela has in the United States.
Rosneft was a partner of PDVSA in joint oil developments in Venezuela. Following the sanctions imposed by Washington against the Maduro government in 2019, Rosneft became one of the main marketing channels for the sanctioned Venezuelan crude: up to 30%, according to reports by the Reuters agency.
For these operations, a Rosneft branch was sanctioned by the US in March 2020. To avoid being affected, the company transferred its operations in Venezuela to another Russian company.
This did not mean a distancing between Moscow and Caracas. On the contrary. Over the past five years, Putin’s government has given numerous signs of support to Maduro.
In December 2018, Russia sent two TU-160 supersonic fighter-bombers to Venezuela, in a gesture that was presented as a sign of military-technical cooperation between the two countries.
Shortly after, in March 2019, Russia opened a training and maintenance center for military helicopters in Venezuela and, a few months later, opened a flight simulation center for SU-M30 aircraft, where Venezuelan pilots can train in handling these advanced fighter-bombers purchased from Moscow.
“Especially during that critical period of 2019-2020 and now, Russia has done a lot of small things to keep the military in Venezuela happy. They moved experts to train Venezuelan personnel, they brought technicians there to make sure that the S300 air defense systems [comprados a Rusia] were operational,” says Evan Ellis.
The expert points out that after the alleged drone attack against Maduro in August 2018, Russia is believed to have sent a group of mercenaries from the Wagner Group to Caracas.
In January 2019, Reuters reported that members of the organization had been sent to protect the Venezuelan president. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said he had no information on this.
More recently, in July, a Russian Navy flotilla, including the Admiral Gorshkov frigate – the most advanced in the country – made a four-day visit to Venezuela to deepen “technical-military cooperation” between the two countries, according to Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino.
Moscow has also been on the front line of diplomatic defense of the Maduro government. Proof of this is that in February 2019, it did not just veto the Security Council resolution calling for “free elections” in Venezuela, but that same day it presented its own resolution expressing concern about threats of use of force against the South American nation, as well as interference in its internal affairs.
In September 2019, Putin welcomed Maduro to Moscow, as he is expected to do before the end of 2024.
What is the reason for Putin’s seemingly unlimited support for Maduro? “Venezuela’s strategic value for Russia and Putin is enormous. Venezuela is one of three actors geographically close to the US that grant Moscow relatively unrestricted military access and political support. This is key to its strategic projection in the region,” says Evan Ellis.
Moscow has also supported Maduro’s government in other ways. In 2017, it agreed to sell 600,000 tons of wheat to alleviate a shortage of wheat in Venezuela, and in February 2018 it sent 300 tons of humanitarian aid, including medicine and food.
Then, during the Covid-19 pandemic, Venezuela acquired ten million doses of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine.
“Russia’s main ally in Latin America”
Ilya Barabanov, senior journalist, BBC Russian Service
Russia has maintained close ties with Venezuela since the time of Hugo Chavez, when the country was one of the few to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, as suited Putin.
Over the past twenty years, the Russian company Rosneft has been actively developing Venezuela’s oil industry, while Gazprom has been extracting oil in Venezuela.
If Cuba was Moscow’s main ally in the region during the Soviet era, Caracas is now. Before the Russian-Ukrainian war, the private military company Wagner also started its security projects in Venezuela.
In response, Venezuela never votes in favor of UN resolutions condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Iran’s practical assistance
Although they have maintained formal relations since 1960, thanks to their status as founders of OPEC, it was not until the governments of Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that ties between Iran and Venezuela grew exponentially.
In the 2000s, Caracas and Tehran established a strategic alliance and signed more than 180 bilateral agreements in numerous areas, worth more than $17 billion.
Many of these agreements remained on paper, while others were only partially fulfilled and abandoned.
Relations lost steam after Chavez’s death and Iran’s subsequent signing of an agreement on its nuclear programme with the US and other Western powers.
However, during the presidency of Donald Trump – who abandoned the nuclear agreement with Iran and imposed oil sanctions on Venezuela – the relationship regained some of its dynamism and led Tehran to play a key role in supporting Maduro.
“The most concrete practical aid to the survival of the Maduro government in recent years has come from Iran,” says Evan Ellis.
And when Maduro had to face sanctions in 2019-2020, Iran resumed its relationship with Venezuela.
Ellis points out that there was initially an agreement whereby Iran sent chemical components required for that country to produce gasoline to Venezuela in exchange for Venezuelan “illicit gold.”
After the US sanctioned Venezuelan oil, Maduro’s government turned to gold – both from international reserves and from the gold being extracted from Venezuelan mines – as a means of international payment in operations about which – partly due to the same sanctions – no public information has been provided.
According to Bloomberg, these payments or shipments of gold would have been made with Iran, Russia, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates.
Iran and Venezuela have also been exchanging Venezuelan heavy crude for lighter Iranian oil that could be used to help fuel production in Venezuela.
Finally, Iran sent technicians and spare parts to repair several refineries in Venezuela and, in this way, help increase gasoline production.
“That allowed Maduro to solve a critical problem: the lack of fuel at a time when his country did not have gasoline even to transport essential goods from one place to another,” says Ellis.
Iran has also provided Venezuela with food and other basic goods. In July 2020, the Megasis supermarket opened in Caracas. It belongs to a chain that has more than 700 stores in Iran and is headed by businessman Issa Rezaei, who was then also deputy minister of industry in that country.
Iran has also helped Venezuela militarily in recent years, supplying it with modern weapons such as armed drones, Zolfaqar missile-launching speedboats and Nasir-1 anti-ship missiles.
According to Joseph Humire, Iran has also helped the Venezuelan government in controlling the opposition and dissent through the Basij, a volunteer unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, “specialized in acting quickly to suppress uprisings and mobilizations.”
“They brought this knowledge to Venezuela in 2008-2009 and have continued to feed these tactics ever since. Iran constantly has uprisings in its own country and has a lot of experience in how to suppress them and they have brought this knowledge to Venezuela,” the expert says.
In 2015, Humire addressed this issue in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Western Hemisphere Subcommittee.
There he said in 2009 that Iranian general Mohamed Reza Naqdi – who would later head the Basij – participated in a high-level meeting in Venezuela with Chávez and Maduro (then foreign minister) to advise on the training of the so-called “collectives”, groups of armed and often hooded civilians who have assumed during Chavismo the mission of “defending the Bolivarian revolution.”
“Years later, the results of this advice are evident on the streets of Venezuela,” he said, noting that the groups had improved their capacity for action.
“United by hostility towards the United States”
Farshad Bayan, BBC Persian Service Editor
Western-led global pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme has brought the two governments closer together.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2005 and his strong anti-Western stance consolidated this relationship and fostered the close personal friendship between Hugo Chávez and the Iranian leader.
Close relations continued after Chavez’s death and Maduro’s succession.
However, following the nuclear deal between Iran and global powers, led by the United States, there has been a notable reduction in the intensity of Iranian interest in seeking close ties with Venezuela, proving the argument that the warmth of their relations is a function of their hostility toward the United States and the intensity of their perception of that country as an existential threat.
With the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the reimposition of the US oil embargo and other sanctions in May 2018, Tehran again turned to Venezuela.
As sanctions tightened, both governments tried to counter the economic consequences. The Iranian government, which had more experience in circumventing U.S. sanctions, tried to lend a helping hand to Venezuela.
In June 2022, Maduro visited Tehran for the first time in six years. He had come to the conclusion that the power and influence of the United States and Western Europe were in decline.
This was the same tune that Iranian leaders had been playing for some time.
Maduro said that during the meeting with Iranian President Raisi, a 20-year strategic cooperation document was discussed. Iran was going to help Venezuela diversify its energy sector.
Details of the strategic cooperation documents were announced during Raisi’s visit to Venezuela in June 2023. The more realistic part of the discussion revolved around Iranian assistance in developing the Venezuelan oil industry, which had been heavily dependent on foreign, especially American, investment and technology.
Given that Iran’s own energy sector is working with outdated oil technology, if the projects actually go ahead, they can only be seen as temporary measures until Venezuela is once again open to doing business with the West.
At the international level, the two countries have coordinated their positions. In this, Venezuela has made the greatest contribution. In the face of growing criticism of Tehran for its performance in human rights, Caracas has been firm in its defense and has voted against all of the any criticism against his ally.
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